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Policy and Prediction: The Case of Institutional 
Diversity in Romanian Higher Education
Lazăr Vlăsceanu*1 and Marian-Gabriel Hâncean2
• Presenting key elements of post-1990 historical developments in the Ro-
manian higher education system, the emphasis is put on recent (2011) 
policies of increasing higher education institutional differentiation. The 
view is that, in policy design, due attention should be paid to both his-
torical roots and predicted developments. Building on an institution-
al analysis approach, we put forward a theoretical model that aims to 
explore the predictive implications of some recently promoted higher 
education policies. These policies are expected to increase institution-
al differentiation at the systemic level and enhance quality in teaching 
and research at university level. The predictive capacity of a model of 
reference is tested against a concurrent model. The key assumption of 
the latter is that of considering higher education institutions (HEIs) as 
“cooperative systems” that are unable to generate those outputs and out-
comes that, by aggregation, would contribute to the construction of an 
institutionally diverse and heterogeneous higher education landscape.
 Keywords: institutional differentiation, macro-level systemic incen-
tives, policy and prediction, Romanian higher education
1 *Corresponding author. Department of sociology, Bucharest University, Bucharest, Romania
 lazarvlasceanu@gmail.com
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Politike in predvidevanje: primer institucionalne 
raznolikosti romunskega visokega šolstva
Lazăr Vlăsceanu* in Marian- Gabriel Hâncean
• Predstavljeni so ključni elementi zgodovinskega razvoja romunskega 
visokošolskega sistema po letu 1990, poudarek pa je na najnovejših poli-
tikah (2011), ki težijo k povečanju institucionalne raznolikosti v visokem 
šolstvu. Pogled, ki je predstavljen, kaže, da je pri oblikovanju politik 
treba pozornost posvetiti zgodovinskemu ozadju in tudi predvidenemu 
razvoju. S pomočjo metode analize institucij je predstavljen teoretični 
model, s katerim avtorja poskušata raziskati napovedane posledice 
nekaterih pred kratkim promoviranih politik visokega šolstva. Za te 
politike se pričakuje, da bodo prispevale k povečanju institucionalnega 
razlikovanja na ravni sistema pa tudi povečanju kakovosti poučevanja 
in raziskovanja na univerzitetni ravni. Napovedana zmogljivost 
referenčnega modela je testirana ob vzporednem modelu. Ključna pred-
postavka zadnjega je upoštevanje visokošolskih ustanov kot »koopera-
tivnih sistemov«, ki ne zmorejo ustvariti takih učinkov in rezultatov, ki 
bi – ob združitvi – prispevali k izgradnji institucionalno raznolike in 
raznovrstne krajine visokošolskega izobraževanja.
 Ključne besede: institucionalna raznolikost, spodbude sistemskih 
sprememb na makroravni, politike in predvidevanje, visoko šolstvo v 
Romuniji 
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Introduction 
In the context of massification, higher education institutions (HEIs) are 
under pressure to meet the various requirements and needs of their direct and 
indirect beneficiaries (Reichert, 2009). Higher education systems with diverse 
and differentiated institutions are considered to have an increased capacity to 
satisfy the various expectations of beneficiaries. This essentially means that sys-
tems with greater institutional diversity may be regarded as a desirable outcome 
(van Vught, 2008). Several dimensions of such an outcome are usually consid-
ered: provision of wider and diverse learning opportunities, increased capacity 
for institutional adaptation to students’ needs, and increased institutional flex-
ibility in responding to domestic and wider social changes. 
Institutional differentiation and institutional diversity bear different 
meanings. Differentiation is commonly seen as a dynamic process in a higher 
education system whereby either the existing HEIs follow specific trajectories 
of development, making them as distinct as possible from others, or new enti-
ties have a better chance of emerging in the system. Differentiation is thus a 
process benefitting from those incentives induced in the system that make each 
HEI assert its distinction. Institutional diversity is the end result of differentia-
tion. It indicates the variety of entities already existing or the ways in which 
new entities may emerge and become consolidated within a system. Diversity 
may take various forms: systemic diversity, structural diversity, programmatic 
diversity, procedural diversity or reputational diversity (van Vught, 2008). 
A key problem in the age of massification concerns ways of achieving 
increasing institutional diversity when a set of systemic incentives for increased 
institutional differentiation have been induced. We address this problem below 
with reference to recent policy initiatives and their developments in the Roma-
nian higher education system.
 
The Romanian higher education system since 1990
During the last 23 years, the Romanian higher education system has 
moved from a “state controlled model” through a “state supervisory model” 
towards a “beneficiary-oriented model” (Păunescu, Florian, & Hâncean, 2012; 
Taylor & Miroiu, 2002). Developments in each new stage have been depend-
ent on those from the previous stage; that is, developments have been “path 
dependent”. In order to substantiate such a stand, let us look more closely at the 
recent history of Romanian higher education and provide some relevant data 
and information.
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Transformations and stages in post-1990 higher education
During the communist regime, the dominant pattern of development 
was that of a state controlled model (i.e., the higher education system was dom-
inated by high degrees of centrality and top-down policy approaches). Between 
1990 and 2010, the institutional model changed into a “state supervisory model” 
(i.e., HEIs were allocated extended degrees of freedom and autonomy, while 
the state retained its regulatory and supervisory powers). During this period, 
the top-down approach to designing and providing public policies continued 
to be a feature of the system. Irrespective of the sources of institutional changes 
– domestic or European – the state retained its central position in deciding the 
main directions to be followed. In this context, the primary tool for the state 
to influence developments in higher education remained associated with the 
public funding stream as it was, with strong quality evaluation instruments and 
policies. New changing initiatives have started to take shape since 2008, firstly 
by undertaking a thorough analysis of the higher education system and institu-
tions, and then by submitting a “strategy of modernisation” together with its 
normative legal basis. This “strategy of modernisation” has initiated a new stage 
in the development and transformation of the Romanian higher education sys-
tem, properly supporting a new institutional framework: a beneficiary-oriented 
approach. The way of designing and implementing public policies within high-
er education has been radically changed. As a salient effect, there has been a 
change from a top-down approach (with the state having the central role and 
functions) to a bottom-up approach (with HEIs having a strong say and role 
in their institutional profiles and missions). One key option of the “strategy 
of modernisation” has been that of increasing the institutional differentiation 
of the higher education system, to the level of functionally generating wider 
institutional diversity. 
Data and information on higher education flows
The number of organisations providing higher education services in-
creased from 48 public universities in 1990 to 108 public and private HEIs in 
2010. Moreover, the number of students enrolled in 2008/2009 was five times 
that of 1990/1991. This is a clear sign that the system shifted from elite educa-
tion, at the end of the 1980s, to intensive massification, starting with the begin-
ning of the 1990s. However, the total number of enrolled students has been 
decreasing since 2009, mostly because of a sharp demographic decline. Fur-
thermore, the number of doctoral students has decreased since 2005/2006. 
c e p s  Journal | Vol.2 | No4 | Year 2012 57
Teaching staff has not increased in correlation with the increase in the total 
number of enrolled students. Taking as a reference the ten-year period from 
2001/2002 to 2009/2010, the student/teaching staff ratio generally increased 
from 22:1 in 2001/2002 to 30:1 in 2009/2010. Obviously, the quality of teaching 
and, indirectly, the time for research have decreased. 
The massification of Romanian higher education has not been correlated 
with an adequate increase in critical resources (e.g., teaching staff stock, finan-
cial inputs, etc.). Moreover, there has not been a uniform massification process. 
Some fields have been exposed to a massive increase in student numbers (e.g., 
social sciences and humanities), while others (e.g., sciences and engineering) 
have faced a steady decrease in students. These different threads have produced 
some contradictory effects. On the one hand, as already mentioned, a huge in-
crease in the student/staff ratio has taken place, while, on the other hand, fac-
ulties whose study programmes have benefited from massification have tried 
to enrol as many students as possible as a means of improving their funding 
streams. Meanwhile, faculties whose study programmes have been confronted 
with decreasing rates of student enrolment have focused on research as a means 
of securing academic standards and additional financial resources. However, 
on the whole, an unintentional consequence of such developments has dramat-
ically emerged: the higher education system has become highly inefficient. The 
ratio of graduates to enrolled students has decreased (e.g., in 1990/1991 there 
were 25,927 graduates for 192,810 enrolled students, while in 2005/2006 there 
were 112,244 graduates for 716,464 enrolled students). In other words, the cost 
of delivering one graduate has consistently increased since 1990.
Another emerging trend concerns the expansion of distance learning. 
For instance, in 1999/2000, only 2% of the student population was enrolled in 
distance learning programmes, while in 2006/2007 we witness an increase to 
23% (Păunescu, Miroiu, & Vlăsceanu, 2011; Vlăsceanu, 2010; Vlăsceanu, Miroiu, 
Păunescu, &Hâncean, 2011). According to research results, during the period 
2004–2008, 6 of the 90 Romanian universities managed to attract 51% of com-
petitive public research funding, with just 3 universities managing to attract 
32%. Such figures sketch a very unbalanced and clustered picture, with a narrow 
minority of universities accessing the great majority of the competitive public 
financial resources allocated by the state to research.
Existing institutional configurations and their pitfalls
Drawing on the empirical evidence selectively mentioned above, we 
can detect several institutional configurations. Firstly, Romania reveals a high 
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number of HEIs relative to the small number of student enrolments and with 
regard to the demographic size of the country. Furthermore, the number of 
study programmes in social sciences and humanities (areas with low market 
demand) is high, while the number of study programmes in science, engineer-
ing and other professional areas is low (despite their having a high market de-
mand). Secondly, there is a decreasing demand for higher education degrees 
due to the diminishing proportion of young people in the population. At the 
same time, Romania is experiencing (a) a continuous shrinking of public funds 
made available to public HE and research, and (b) a rather low internationally 
relevant and competitive research output. Thirdly, the system is dominated by a 
high level of institutional isomorphism in terms of HEIs’ assumed missions and 
with reference to their structures, governance and organisation of curricula. 
The HE system has revealed reduced institutional differentiation and a growing 
gap between the stated mission of the HEI and its realisation.  
Such configurations in the Romanian system of higher education high-
light its lack of sustainability in many respects: systemic inefficiency, high in-
stitutional isomorphism, low economic relevance, poor research productivity, 
decreasing quality provision, etc.
Promoting new policies, particularly in the areas of institutional 
differentiation
New policies, legal arrangements3 and institutional incentives have re-
cently been put forward to change the system from a state supervisory model 
towards a beneficiaries-oriented approach. This new institutional approach was 
inter alia thought to breed higher levels of institutional differentiation and di-
versity (see Figure 1 and Table 1). 
Figure 1. Outlining the new institutional arrangements
3 We refer here especially to the Education Act No. 1/2011 and to all its corresponding by-
laws (e.g., the methodology for university classification and study programme ranking, the 
methodology for higher education quality assurance, the methodology for university funding, 
etc.).
a.   Systemic actions
b.   Institutional actions
c.  A mix of systemic and 
institutional actions
Major dimensions of 
reconfiguration
ü	quality
ü	relevance
ü	competitiveness
Structural & functional 
reconfiguration 
of the HE landscape
THE CORE OF THE NEW APPROACH: FOCUS ON (DIRECT & INDIRECT) BENEFICIARIES
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Table 1. The reconfiguration of the Romanian higher education landscape
a.  Systemic actions b.  Institutional actions c.  A mix of systemic and institutional actions
(i)  increasing uni-
versity autonomy 
as this is related 
to clear means of 
accountability;
(ii)  producing great-
er institutional 
diversity and 
differentiation 
through univer-
sity classification 
and study pro-
gramme ranking; 
and 
(iii) introducing a 
new funding 
formula: public 
funding depen-
dent on teaching 
and research 
outputs, and on 
real costs.
ü	HEIs governing 
structures: HEIs to 
opt for either a more 
collegiate or a more 
managerial type of 
governing structure;
ü	restructuring institu-
tional missions and  
internal organisa-
tion: HEIs to set up 
their own internal 
structures in line 
with the prospects 
of a new mission 
and its successful 
realisation;
ü	diversifying financial 
sources: allowing 
universities to set 
up commercial 
companies and 
foundations.
–  a new approach to quality assurance, 
an approach that places more empha-
sis on learning and research outcomes;
–  huge concern over innovating curricula 
and teaching quality, so as to provide 
public financial incentives for innova-
tions and for staff recruitment and 
promotion;
–  providing new incentives, so as to 
increase research outputs and to 
reorganise doctoral and master’s study 
programmes;
–  developing qualification tracer stud-
ies, so as to increase the relevance of 
HEIs’ outputs to market demands and 
students’ personal development;
–  rethinking the relationship between 
UEFISCDI (i.e., The Executive Agency 
for Higher Education, Research, Devel-
opment and Innovation Funding) and 
intermediary collegiate bodies.*
Note: 
* Put somewhat differently, this rethinking is to set up and/or strengthen buffer collegiate 
bodies, under the umbrella of an executive agency (i.e., UEFISCDI) meant to provide na-
tional and international information on higher education and to increase inter-institutional 
communication.
The implementation of the new institutional arrangements began in 
2011, after the new Education Act (No. 1/2011) was passed. The process of re-
configuring Romanian higher education is only at an early stage; important 
outcomes are to be expected both in the near future and in the longer term. 
Nevertheless, the institutional differentiation process has had a solid start, al-
ready producing effects. We refer to the University Evaluation Exercise4 (UEE) 
conducted by several national collegiate councils (i.e., the Romanian Agency 
for Quality Assurance in Higher Education – ARACIS, the University Research 
Council – CNCS, the Council on the Attestation of University Qualifications 
and Degrees – CNATDCU, all in close cooperation with the European Univer-
sity Association – EUA). The aims of the UEE include: (a) university classifica-
tion: to classify HEIs into three clusters, according to their stated mission and 
academic outputs; (b) study programme ranking: to rank study programmes in 
4 By the UEE, we refer to both University Classification and Study Programme Ranking. 
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terms of their academic and research outputs. Study programme ranking has 
been mainly quantitatively oriented, while university classification has been 
built on both qualitative and quantitative assessment, in order to identify the 
extent to which each university manages to accomplish its stated mission and 
strategic goals. The qualitative evaluation exercise has been carried out by inde-
pendent European expert teams mobilised by the EUA within its Institutional 
Evaluation Programme.    
The UEE aims at differentiating universities on several axes: research, 
teaching and learning, relations with the national and international environ-
ment, and institutional capacity. It is expected to produce two types of differ-
entiation: (a) classifying universities into three classes (i.e., research intensive, 
research and teaching, and only teaching-focused universities); and (b) ranking 
study programmes into five categories (i.e., A, B, C, D and E) across ranking 
academic domains. University classification produces only nominal differenti-
ated classes, while study programme ranking produces ordinal (hierarchical) 
categories of study programmes, in terms of quality and outputs.
The outcomes of the UEE are connected to degree-awarding powers and 
financial incentives. For instance, universities placed in the teaching-focused 
class would be prevented financially (out of public sources) from the right to 
organise doctoral studies. At the same time, study programmes ranked as cat-
egory A are to receive more money, while study programmes ranked as cat-
egory E will not receive any public funding. The quantitative component of the 
UEE was completed in 2011. It involved collecting and processing raw data on 
the aforementioned criteria.5 Such data are made available on an open public 
website.6 The process faced a number of methodological and theoretical con-
straints, which demanded several academic debates in order to identify: (i) an 
acceptable range of indicators for measuring institutional outputs; (ii) strategies 
of populating each indicator with those data that allow for a fair national com-
parability across institutions; (iii) formulae for relating indicators and  identify-
ing university classes; (iv) optimal ways of allocating weighting to each indi-
cator in the overall assessment of institutional outputs. The initial evaluation 
provided the first classification of universities and the first study programme 
rankings.7 Once the quantitative side of the exercise was accomplished, the 
5 The variables corresponding to the evaluation criteria were issued through Ministerial Order No. 
4174/2011, available at http://chestionar.uefiscdi.ro/docs/OMECTS%204174%20modificare%20
OMECTS%204072.pdf (Romanian only, retrieved on 2 April 2012).
6 See for this issue http://chestionar.uefiscdi.ro/ (Romanian only, retrieved on 2 April 2012).
7 The results of the university evaluation exercise – the quantitative evaluation – are available at 
http://chestionar.uefiscdi.ro/ (Romanian only, retrieved on 2 April 2012). 
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qualitative evaluation of each university was initiated and is currently under 
way (see Table 2).
Table 2. The main components of the University Evaluation Exercise
2011 Quantitative evaluation component
Statistical analysis of empirical raw 
data.
4 evaluation criteria: teaching and 
learning, research, relations to envi-
ronment, institutional capacity.
Outputs
Preliminary evaluation of universities
ü	 3 categories of universities 
(research intensive, research and 
teaching, and teaching-focused 
universities);
ü	 in each ranking domain, a study 
programme ranking into 5 classes 
(A, B, C, D and E).
2012-2015 Quantitative evaluation component
Visits of evaluation foreign expert 
teams to each university.
Qualitative evaluation criteria: to 
what extent each university satisfies 
its assumed institutional mission and 
validation of the outputs produced 
by the qualitative evaluation com-
ponent.
Outputs
Final evaluation of universities
A way of predicting policy outcomes
After briefly outlining the historical background and the new policy 
of institutional differentiation implemented in the Romanian higher educa-
tion system, a question of further interest is that of predicting outcomes of this 
policy. In so doing, we take the position that any new higher education policy 
should be regarded from the perspective of both its historical roots and the 
predicted consequences of its implementation. 
The prediction of policy outcomes may be considered to be of two types: 
(a) prediction embedded in the policy as such so as to allow for the constant 
monitoring of policy implementation; (b) prediction made when launching a 
policy in order to theoretically evaluate its outcomes. The former is empirically 
grounded and provides a means for achieving optimal policy implementation. 
It allows for the introduction of corrections during policy implementation and 
promotes eventual adjustments that compete for better achieving well stated 
policy objectives. The latter is anticipatory and provides a means for identifying 
the degree of confidence one may have when opting for implementing a given 
policy. 
For predicting policy outcomes in our case and validating them at this 
initial stage of policy implementation, we consider two models of interest: (a) 
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one predictive model, based on the assumptions of a well known institutional 
analysis in social sciences (Meyer & Rowan, 2006), and (b) a concurrent model, 
aimed at testing the validity of the former. 
The predictive model
The predictive model is a hypothetical model. Building on an institu-
tional analysis approach, the model predicts the behaviour of Romanian HEIs 
in the context of certain policy incentives. Specifically, the model aims to pre-
dict how the beneficiaries-oriented approach is expected to increase institu-
tional differentiation, at a systemic level, and quality in teaching and scientific 
research, at a university level. 
The model builds on the assumption that a powerful external selective 
incentive system is to steer the behaviour of every HEI. This should occur in 
spite of intra-university diversity of interests. The model has a three-layered 
structured pay-off matrix as a building pillar. Firstly, there is the core layer, 
which highlights several features: (i) increasing differentiation and diversifica-
tion in order to satisfy students’ interests; (ii) increasing university transpar-
ency in order to help students make informed decisions; (iii) enhancing the 
quality of university services and study programme provision according to the 
institutional assumed mission; (iv) increasing efficiency in public funding and 
the contribution of Romanian higher education to national socioeconomic de-
velopment. Secondly, there is the intermediary layer (or incentive schemata), 
which supports the idea that degree awarding powers and public funding al-
location must be based on the UEE results. Thirdly, there is the surface layer, 
i.e., the rapports between the observed and expected behaviour. On this layer, 
universities are expected to improve efficiency in their internal use of resources, 
so as to have as many study programmes as possible within categories A and B 
(see Table 3).
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Table 3. Expected university structural behaviour
a. Managing university classification
Research intensive 
category
Research and teaching 
category
Teaching-focused universities 
category
University X
University Y
University Z
...
University K
University L (t+1)
University Q
University P
University R
...
University W
University U
University T
University L 
University L (t+1)
...
University S
Note: Given the incentive schemata, University L might, for instance, try to migrate from 
the teaching-focused universities class to the research intensive class. However, if this is 
the case, then at the moment t+1 University L should have increased its research outputs, 
otherwise this migration will not be possible. Essentially, each university has the possibility 
of either migrating to the expected university class or remaining in the corresponding class.  
b. Managing study programme rankings
 Ranking domain α
Study 
programme
class A
Study 
programme
class B
Study 
programme
class C
Study 
programme 
class D
Study 
programme 
class E
University X
University Y
University Z
...
University K
University L (t+1)
University Q
University P
University R
...
University W
University U
University T
University L 
University L (t+1)
...
University S
University J
University I
University V
...
University M
University N
University I
University G
...
University H
Note: Given the incentive schemata, University L, for instance, might try to improve the 
quality of its corresponding study programme, within ranking domain α, so as to move from 
Class C to Class A (at time t+1). If this is not possible, then University L (at time t+1) might 
either seek out alternative funding streams to support the study programme or simply 
eliminate the programme from its higher education service package. 
The model predicts that the beneficiaries-oriented approach will gener-
ate institutional differentiation and enhance academic quality due to the se-
lective incentives promoted by the policy design. Essentially, for every higher 
education policy area (e.g., quality assurance, public funding, etc.) that the new 
institutional arrangements aim to reform or change there is a similar payoff ma-
trix. Secondly, all of the payoff matrices that could be designed have a common 
core layer (as shown in Figure 2). Thirdly, for the time being, one cannot assess 
the surface layer, as the implementation of the new institutional arrangement 
is in a early stage (which is the main reason that it is impossible to empiri-
cally test the model at this stage). Still, the theoretical idea of a payoff matrix 
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is suitable for application in predicting the outcomes of the UEE policy when 
considering its advanced implementation. For all of the major changes that the 
new institutional arrangement is expected to deliver in other areas – such as 
quality assurance, public funding, etc. – one could envisage similar payoff ma-
trices. Fourthly, we theoretically predict a small variance between expected and 
observed behaviour for every payoff matrix (in respect to quality assurance, 
public funding, etc.). 
Figure 2. The three-layered matrix composition of the model
According to the predictive model, one could expect significant differ-
ences between the predicted and the observed behaviour under some condi-
tions: (a) the incentives are not allocated properly; (b) the content of the core 
layer is to be significantly modified in the near future; (c) the results of periodi-
cal political elections will change the payoff matrix.  
The concurrent theoretical model
To test the validity of the predictive model, a concurrent model, com-
posed of several theoretical elements, may prove useful. Our proposed concur-
rent model is based on several assumptions, all of them having been already 
demonstrated elsewhere.
Core layer
Direct beneficiaries
Diversification & differentiation
Transparency
Quality
Efficiency in public funding
Contribution to national  
development
Intermediary layer
Public funding allocation
Degree awarding power
Surface layer
Expected behavior vs. observed behavior
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1.  Universities8 are cooperative systems, comprising diverse groups of interests that 
try to fulfil their agendas by informal structuring. These groups contribute to 
the achievement of the general goals of university as long as university is seen 
as a means for satisfying their specific interests (Pfeffer, 1995, p. 73). Inciden-
tally, if university members fail in their attempts to satisfy their agenda of in-
terests, their contributions to the organisational processes begin to decrease, 
putting the achievement of university objectives at risk. As systems of coop-
eration, universities are considered to include a large diversity of groups: stu-
dents, administrative apparatus, academics and researchers, top management, 
representatives of professional associations, employers, etc. (Reichert, 2009). 
This highly diverse composition generates a high level of diversity of inter-
ests, which may sometimes be divergent or antagonistic. In the given context, 
within universities, informal internal structures might greatly affect and deter 
the optimal functioning of the formal internal structure (Scott, 2003). 
2.  HEIs operate as professional bureaucracies. The top management of uni-
versities is loosely coupled with the operating core. Incidentally, the 
behaviour of academics and researchers cannot be properly guided or 
controlled by formal arrangements. This dual structuring is due to univer-
sities operating as professional bureaucracies (Mintzberg, 1993). Within 
professional bureaucracies, the standardisation of skills is the prime co-
ordinating mechanism, while vertical and horizontal decentralisation is 
one of the main design parameters. How such arrangements operate has a 
bearing on envisaged outcomes and on any HE policy implementation.
3.  The informal structures of HEIs are preeminent and greatly affect the func-
tioning of formal internal arrangements. The configuration of the internal 
structures of HEIs impacts organisational efficiency. One should further 
consider the fact that universities are embedded in a thick and dense fab-
ric of networks of relations and shaped by a diverse array of institutional 
arrangements, which has strong implications for their level of homogene-
ity or diversity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
4.  Changing the institutional environment is not sufficient to produce a 
change in internal organisational cultures. HEIs are assumed to vary in 
terms of their organisational cultures and specificity. Changing internal 
informal institutions is difficult without major interventions in internal 
organisational cultures. 
8 In Romania, all of the HEIs accredited by the Romanian Quality Assurance in Higher Education 
(ARACIS) are labelled as universities; otherwise, they are simply termed as HEIs. However, 
in spite of this legal distinction, in the present paper we refer to universities and HEIs without 
discriminating between them.
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The concurrent model argues that the observed behaviour of any HEI is 
primarily the result of a mix of formal and informal structuring configurations. 
External stimuli would stand a low probability of generating linear outcomes, 
mainly when considering the fact the university’s diverse interest groups have 
a filtering impact. Consequently, the same external institutional arrangements 
might produce different outcomes within the same population of HEIs. In oth-
er words, the probability of the same institutional framework producing the 
same outcomes in a population of HEIs has a sparse distribution. 
Confronting the models
When grasping the concurrent model, universities struggle against in-
ternal constraining forces emerging from the great diversity of their constitu-
ents. When grasping the predictive model, HEIs must cope with forces emerg-
ing from external systemic institutional arrangements. The two models predict 
different outcomes vis-à-vis the beneficiaries-oriented approach. The point is 
to theoretically estimate whether institutional differentiation might be reached, 
providing that the institutional arrangements are adequately implemented. 
According to the predictive model, the new systemic institutional ar-
rangements should produce institutional differentiation. The selective incentives 
are causal mechanisms differently affecting both HEIs and their stakeholders in a 
coherent manner. Here, we are referring to several aspects: prospective students 
would make informed decisions, top management of universities would adopt 
and pursue adequate institutional missions, academics would set their career lad-
ders within a competitive environment, and public funding would primarily fol-
low excellence in teaching and scientific research, and would avoid poor quality 
study programmes. The model predicts outcomes in a linear manner.   
The concurrent model, on the other hand, predicts outcomes in a non-
linear manner. The effects of external formal arrangements are filtered and 
affected by intra-organisational informal and formal structures. On these 
grounds, it might appear extremely difficult to support the idea that systemic 
public policies reach their expected objectives in a coherent manner. Conse-
quently, if this is the case, systemic institutional arrangements should be subject 
to constant review.
As the HE reform in Romania is currently under way, we are not able 
to empirically test the two alternative models. However, one could envisage 
another type of testing. For instance, one could test the two models against 
each other hypothetically. The results could be used to indicate which model 
entails the highest probability of making sound predictions. Let us further use 
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this approach in order to demonstrate the importance of having a predictive 
approach embedded in any policy design and implementation.
Within the Romanian higher education landscape, HEIs are highly de-
pendent on their external environment. All of their critical resources (e.g., pro-
spective students, public funding, legitimacy, sources of reputation, etc.) are to 
be found outside their settings. In order to access the desired critical resources, 
universities must adapt their behaviour to the requirements of the external en-
vironment. Striving for critical resource access and managing external forces, 
universities of the system, as a specific population of organisations, adopt a 
process of institutional isomorphism. This institutional isomorphism, deliv-
ered through the attempts of organisations to survive and reach optimisation, 
will feature high levels of homogeneity. 
Institutional isomorphism is triggered by three mechanisms: coercive 
isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism and normative isomorphism (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983). During times of institutional reforms, universities are generally 
confronted with powerful coercive isomorphism. This is the case in the Roma-
nian higher education landscape: HEIs must legally meet all formal require-
ments. As the predictive model shows, all HEIs are compelled to make the nec-
essary adjustments in order to observe the systemic institutional arrangements. 
These adjustments imply not only organisational mechanisms and operations, 
but also require academics and other staff and students to undertake corre-
sponding actions within their settings. In other words, the incentives brought 
forth by the Romanian reforms are so strong and diverse that they involve not 
only the top management of universities but also their operating cores. Even 
if HEIs respond in the same manner to the coercive isomorphism imposed by 
the state authorities responsible for higher education, they are institutionally 
differentiated using the same criteria. 
The concurrent model’s prediction, that the internal formal and infor-
mal structures of HEIs would filter out the effects produced by systemic public 
policies, cannot be supported theoretically. However, we might expect some 
HEIs to slow the process of adopting changes, due to their organisational cul-
tural profiles. 
On such theoretical grounds, and despite the lack of empirical testing, 
we are inclined to admit that the predictive model entails a high probability of 
correctly predicting the outcomes expected to be produced by systemic reform. 
Providing that the policy is further implemented and refined without becoming 
affected by political quarrels, we are confident, at an acceptable level of prob-
ability, that the envisaged institutional differentiation will come about and gen-
erate its further codes of configuration.   
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Conclusion
The Romanian higher education landscape is currently shifting from a 
state supervisory model to a beneficiary-oriented approach. The newly provi-
sioned institutional arrangements aim to produce institutional differentiation 
and to enhance quality in teaching and research. 
Building on an institutional analysis approach, we have provided the 
historical background of the current higher education policy in Romania and 
have demonstrated the need for a predictive dimension in any higher education 
policy. With regard to the latter, we have theoretically discussed the possibil-
ity of predicting the future behaviours of Romanian HEIs. To this end, two 
alternative models of prediction have been proposed: the predictive model and 
the concurrent testing model. The former predicts that the currently emerging 
institutional arrangements, delivered by the Romanian reform, are expected to 
increase institutional differentiation at the systemic level and enhance quality 
in teaching and research at the university level. 
The capacity of the predictive model to produce strong predictions is 
proposed to be tested against a concurrent model of HEIs envisaged as coop-
erative systems. The concurrent model argues that, at a structural level, HEIs 
could generate outputs and outcomes that, by aggregation, do not contribute to 
the construction of an institutionally diverse and heterogeneous higher educa-
tion landscape. After testing the two models against each other, we theoreti-
cally claim that the predictive model would entail a higher probability of bet-
ter predicting the outcomes expected to be produced by the systemic reforms. 
The concurrent model may be valid only if systemic institutional arrangements 
imply organisations adopting changes in a top-down manner. When HEIs are 
affected by selective incentives, the changes directly permeate at all levels. Un-
der these circumstances, the ability of HEIs to filter out the impact of systemic 
institutional arrangements is significantly reduced.       
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